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Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a), this brief is filed with the consent of all 
parties. 
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that no party or parties' counsel authored any part of this brief or paid any costs 
associated with its preparation or submission, and no person other than amicus 
curiae or its counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or 
submitting the brief. 
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 2 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1.  Whether Congress may, pursuant to its limited and enumerated authority 
“to regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,” mandate that individuals 
who do not want to engage in commerce must enter into specified insurance 
contracts with third parties. 
2.  Whether unconstitutional provisions of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act are severable from the remainder of the Act. 
 3 
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
The Heritage Foundation (Heritage) is a District of Columbia nonpartisan, 
nonprofit research institute that is recognized as exempt under section 501(c)(3) of 
the Internal Revenue Code, with the mission “to formulate and promote 
conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited 
government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national 
defense.” 
 Soon after its inception in 1973, Heritage’s domestic policy scholars began 
analyzing, and educating policymakers and the public about, health policy issues 
and proposals for health policy reform. In several publications and statements over 
the last decade, Heritage health policy experts have opposed on purely policy 
grounds a government-enforced mandate that individuals or families buy health 
insurance. In its opening brief in this Court, the United States quotes a 21-year-old 
lecture by a Heritage policy expert supporting a government-enforced mandate. 
Because the United States has made an issue of Heritage’s policy position and left 
a potentially misleading impression of its current position, Heritage has a strong 
interest in explaining to this Court why its health policy experts have concluded 
that an insurance mandate is unnecessary to expand health coverage significantly 
and, indeed, is highly undesirable. 
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 Since the creation of its Center for Legal & Judicial Studies (Legal Center) 
in 2000, Heritage also has played a leading role analyzing the constitutionality and 
legal implications of various public policy proposals.  In December 2009, 
Heritage’s Legal Center published an 18-page Legal Memorandum examining the 
constitutionality of the “individual mandate” provision in the then-pending health 
care bill.1 The Legal Memorandum suggested there were several constitutional 
means to increase health care coverage, but noted the costly implications of the 
individual mandate then being debated, and concluded that it would be 
unconstitutional as drafted.  Several Members of Congress relied on Heritage’s 
Legal Memorandum in debates over the constitutionality of the pending bill and 
entered it into the Congressional Record.  Since that time, Heritage legal scholars 
have remained active in commenting on and educating the public about the 
unconstitutional nature of the individual mandate in the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148 (2010), as amended (PPACA). 
                                                 
1 Randy Barnett, Nathaniel Stewart, and Todd Gaziano, Why the Personal Mandate 
to Buy Health Insurance Is Unprecedented and Unconstitutional, HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION LEGAL MEMORANDUM NO. 49 (Dec. 9, 2009).  
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In its merits brief before this Court, the United States quotes a 21-year-old 
statement by a Heritage policy expert supporting the need for a household 
insurance mandate.2 If citations to policy papers were subject to the same rules as 
legal citations, then the Heritage position quoted by the Department of Justice 
would have a red flag indicating it had been reversed.  Not only was the policy 
statement taken somewhat out of context (the author in 1989 conditioned such a 
mandate on tax reform and tax savings provided to families to fully or partially 
offset the cost of the insurance), but Heritage has stopped supporting any insurance 
mandate. 
Heritage policy experts never supported an unqualified mandate like that in 
the PPACA.  Their prior support for a qualified mandate was limited to 
catastrophic coverage (true insurance that is precisely what the PPACA forbids), 
coupled with tax relief for all families and other reforms that are conspicuously 
absent from the PPACA. Since then, a growing body of research has provided a 
strong basis to conclude that any government insurance mandate is not only 
unnecessary, but is a bad policy option.  Moreover, Heritage’s legal scholars have 
been consistent in explaining that the type of mandate in the PPACA is 
                                                 
2 See Brief for Appellants at 37, quoting Stuart M. Butler, The Heritage Lectures 
218: Assuring Affordable Health Care for All Americans, HERITAGE FOUNDATION 
LECTURE NO. 218, at 6 (1989). 
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unconstitutional.3  In short, The Heritage Foundation opposes the PPACA 
individual mandate as unwise policy and as unconstitutional legislation. 
Although the government quotes lectures from 1989 as if the state of 
economic and policy research is static, that is never the case.  The truth is always 
much more valuable and interesting.  Empirical and other policy research in the 
past two decades—and relevant legal analysis—confirm what in fact was always 
the case: (1) health insurance individual mandates will fail and are bad public 
policy; and (2) the federal government’s attempt to force private citizens to 
purchase health insurance in the PPACA is unconstitutional. 
ARGUMENT AND CITATIONS OF AUTHORITY 
It is difficult to understand why the United States would, in a brief putatively 
discussing the constitutionality of the insurance mandate, quote a 21-year-old 
policy statement which was abandoned and subsequently called a “serious 
mistake” by the institutional issuers of that statement,4 and which, far from 
answering the question presented to this Court, did not in 1989 consider any 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Barnett, supra, HERITAGE FOUNDATION LEGAL MEMORANDUM NO. 49; 
Todd Gaziano and Elizabeth Garvey, The Expansion of National Power at the 
Expense of Individual Liberty, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, ABC-CLIO (2011). 
4 Nina Owcharenko and Robert E. Moffit, The Massachusetts Health Plan: 
Lessons for the States, HERITAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER NO. 1953, at 3 
(July 18, 2006). See also Robert E. Moffit, Choice and Consequences: Transparent 
Alternatives to The Individual Insurance Mandate, 9 HARV. HEALTH POL’Y REV. 
223, 226 (2008). 
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constitutional question. Whatever the government’s purpose, Heritage thinks 
resorting to abandoned and empirically repudiated ideas from another era is a sign 
of desperation and highlights the impotence of Appellants’ current policy 
argument. 
I. Current Policy Research Demonstrates That An Insurance 
Mandate Carries Steep Costs, Is Unnecessary And Undesirable. 
 
Heritage’s health policy scholars relied on economic, behavioral, empirical, 
and philosophical grounds in rejecting an individual mandate.5  Because the United 
States relies on a Heritage’s policy lecture from more than two decades ago (and 
takes it out of context), the Court should benefit from understanding how 
Heritage’s original position differed from the individual mandate in the PPACA, 
and more importantly, the compelling reasons that led Heritage policy experts to 
reject any type of individual mandate altogether. 
In an effort to promote a stable and more affordable health care market, 
policymakers have long struggled to deal with competing market forces (including 
government-created distortions to the market). Two challenges to consumer-based 
reforms are: (a) adverse-selection effects, in which healthy individuals choose not 
to purchase insurance coverage, leading to increased premiums for others and 
                                                 
5 The views of Heritage’s policy experts on an insurance mandate were unrelated 
to any constitutional analysis until recently because they are not trained in the law 
and Heritage’s Legal Center was not created until 2000 to provide complex legal 
analysis. 
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causing some of these others to leave the marketplace; and (b) the “free rider” 
problem, where those who do not purchase coverage can still obtain care at others’ 
expense, including costly emergency room care based on legal obligations on 
participants in federal programs, see, e.g., Hospital Survey and Construction Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 291, et seq. (1946); Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1986). 
Though extant before then, the idea of a health insurance mandate gained 
traction in the late 1980s when federal programs helped push health care costs 
sharply upward. See, e.g., Julie Rovner, Republicans Spurn Once-Favored Health 
Mandate, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Feb.15, 2010, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=123670612 (quoting Mark 
Pauly on the group of “economists and health policy people” who helped promote 
the idea in the late 1980s); Randall R. Bovbjerg and William G. Kopit, Coverage 
and Care for the Medically Indigent: Public and Private Options, 19 IND. L. REV. 
857, 909 (1986). 
Although Heritage never supported a PPACA-style mandate, and has since 
changed its policy position to oppose all mandates, Heritage health care experts 
previously (albeit mistakenly) accepted the view that a limited insurance mandate 
might be necessary to address these market and government-created effects.  Their 
proposals differed in at least two significant ways from the type of mandate 
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employed in the PPACA: (a) Heritage scholars always conditioned their support 
for an insurance mandate on fundamental tax reform that would provide direct tax 
relief to households to offset the cost of the insurance and on other reforms that are 
also conspicuously absent from the PPACA, and (b) their policy statements also 
make clear that such a mandate should only require coverage for “catastrophic” 
injuries or illnesses. Heritage argued that individuals should pay for routine care 
out of pocket.  Not only does the PPACA not embrace these limits, it prohibits 
catastrophic-only policies, excepting only those programs which meet stringent 
grandfathering requirements.6 
Heritage policy experts have been involved in the debate over mandates for 
many years, but its own research contributed to the growing consensus among 
market-based economists and health policy experts that such a mandate is not 
necessary to achieve a high level of coverage and will never produce the mythical 
“universal” coverage that its advocates desire.7  In some prior years, Heritage 
scholars have occasionally used the term “soft mandate,” or similar language, but 
                                                 
6 See Pub. L. No. 111-148, §1302(c)(1) and 26 U.S.C. §5000(A)(f)(1)(D), as 
amended by Pub. L. No. 111-148, §1501(b). 
7 In contrast, the government’s reliance on a 21-year-old policy lecture seems to 
suggest a belief that anyone who was interested in any form of insurance mandate 
in 1989 should love the PPACA mandate today.  That is like arguing that any 
medical researcher who expressed qualified support for one therapy 21 years ago 
should naturally favor a broader application of that therapy today, even if his own 
and other research has disproven the assumptions that supported the original 
approach. 
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even a cursory reading of their articles reveals that they were not advocating a 
PPACA-style mandate, and most often were referring to proposals for automatic 
enrollment with an opt-out provision or tax credits to induce voluntary 
participation.8 
But support for any mandate is unwarranted, even some that may be termed 
“soft mandates” by others.  Recent policy research has increasingly confirmed that 
a government-enforced mandate to buy health insurance is not only philosophically 
troubling, but also bad policy for a number of reasons. First, breakthroughs in 
behavioral economics strengthened the argument for alternative approaches. For 
example, research on automatic enrollment for retirement savings provided 
important empirical evidence that a mandate was not necessary to significantly 
increase participation rates. A study of pension contributions at a major 
corporation utilizing automatic enrollment with opt-out procedures led to 
impressive results: automatic enrollment procedures resulted in an increase of 
participation from 61% to 86%, besting other attempts to increase participation, 
such as employer-provided financial education or even increasing the employer 
                                                 
8 For example, in 2003, Stuart Butler testified before the U.S. Senate Special 
Committee on Aging and supported using a “soft mandate,” which could include 
losing tax benefits, instead of a “hard mandate,” which would make the failure to 
obtain coverage illegal. In Critical Condition: America’s Ailing Health Care 
System, Hearing Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 108th Cong. 68-81 
(2003) (statement of Stuart M. Butler).   
 11 
match.  Brigitte C. Madrian and Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia 
in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 7682 (2000). 
Moreover, Madrian and Shea found that automatic enrollment greatly 
increased the participation of employees who otherwise were less likely to enroll in 
the pension program, including younger employees.  Id. at 24. These and other 
studies led Heritage experts to conclude that “[w]ith modifications, a similar 
process [to automatic pensions enrollment], including enrollment in a ‘default’ 
health plan, could be replicated with health insurance, thus dramatically reducing 
the adverse selection that the individual mandate is designed to remedy.” Robert E. 
Moffit, Choice and Consequences: Transparent Alternatives to the Individual 
Insurance Mandate, 9 HARV. HEALTH  POL’Y REV. 223, 229 (2008). 
Second, research on the experience with other mandates, including auto 
insurance, income tax filing, and draft registration, showed that they fall well short 
of achieving universal compliance. Accordingly, the individual mandate for health 
insurance was likely to fail, even if one accepted as desirable the goal of universal 
coverage. Heritage’s Robert Moffit later explained in the Harvard Health Policy 
Review that the mandate’s price in lost liberty would be too high, especially if it 
was no better at achieving universal coverage than other, more consumer-friendly 
means. “On philosophical grounds, policymakers should retain a bias for personal 
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liberty.” Moffitt, supra, 9 HARV. HEALTH  POL’Y REV. at 226. Moffit argued 
instead for practical alternatives based on personal responsibility that would 
produce high coverage rates and would interfere with the market and individual 
liberty less. 
 Third, mandates increase the expense of coverage for many of the uninsured 
that they are purported to help.  For example, the PPACA requires not only the 
purchase of coverage, but expansive coverage, precluding lower-cost plans.  The 
PPACA also requires insurers to compress the ratio of ratings between younger 
and older enrollees. This leads to higher premiums, particularly for the younger 
and healthier employees—the very people that mandates purport to be forcing into 
the insurance pool. See Robert E. Moffitt, Obamacare and the Individual Mandate: 
Violating Personal Liberty and Federalism, HERITAGE FOUNDATION WEBMEMO 
NO. 3103 (Jan. 18, 2011).  And other major expense drivers for the cost of the 
provision of health care, like the widespread practice of defensive medicine (i.e., 
over-testing and over-treatment) in response to large non-economic damage awards 
in medical malpractice suits, are completely unaddressed by a mandate, or 
effectively, by anything else in PPACA.9 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Bill G. Batchelder et al., Tort Reform in the States: Protecting 
Consumers and Enhancing Economic Growth, HERITAGE FOUNDATION LECTURE 
NO. 1152 (Sept. 18, 2009). 
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 Fourth, these increased costs for insurance may worsen the adverse selection 
problem.  Because insurance carriers are required under PPACA to provide 
coverage for individuals with pre-existing conditions, and because the penalty on 
individuals for failing to purchase coverage is relatively light compared to the 
increased premium costs, individuals will “have every incentive to pay the light 
penalty and sign up for insurance if they get sick and drop out of coverage when 
they get well. This will induce a severe case of adverse selection, as the less stable 
pools are disproportionately populated with older and sicker enrollees, resulting in 
a deadly cost spiral.” Id. In an attempt to solve a comparatively mild adverse 
selection problem in the current market, a mandate, when coupled with other 
regulations that raise costs, such as those in the PPACA, actually increases the 
adverse selection problem to the point that it may threaten the viability of the 
health care market. 
Fifth, mandates coupled with minimum benefits requirements, which restrict 
the availability of levels of coverage or types of insurance (for example, some 
high-deductible coverage or limited benefit plans) greatly reduce consumer choice.  
Some of the plans that are or likely are restricted under PPACA are among the 
most cost-effective and desirable for the uninsured. Consumer choice is an element 
of individual liberty to determine one’s own health care plan. Mandates like the 
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one in PPACA limit choice, and do so in ways that are counterproductive to the 
goal of providing optimal insurance to consumers at competitive prices. 
Based on this and other research, Heritage policy experts have actively 
challenged the notion that an individual insurance mandate is necessary to solve 
the adverse selection or free-rider problem, and have instead worked to show better 
ways to do so.  Moreover, the policy research and analysis discussed in the 
preceding paragraphs strongly suggests that the mandate in the PPACA is not even 
conducive to those ends. Thus, while Heritage analysts once supported a limited 
and qualified insurance mandate, at no time did they advocate a PPACA-style 
mandate.  More importantly, mandates are not necessary to provide broad-based 
insurance coverage; this goal can be met more effectively through other means 
which are market-based and do not infringe individual liberty.  Thus, mandates—
particularly inflexible mandates like the one found in the PPACA—are bad public 
policy. 
II. Heritage Has Consistently Explained That A PPACA-Style 
Mandate Is Unconstitutional. 
 
Although Heritage’s first serious legal analysis of the PPACA was not 
published until late 2009, its view on the limits of Congress’s Commerce power 
has been known for years. Heritage’s Legal Center has consistently articulated the 
position that the Commerce Clause does not transform a national government of 
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limited and enumerated powers into one of limitless authority.10 Moreover, 
Heritage legal fellows have applied this principle consistently, expressing 
constitutional doubts about provisions in several bills supported on policy grounds 
by many conservative constituencies.11 
Soon after congressional sponsors articulated the plan for what became the 
insurance mandate in the PPACA—one in which Congress simply mandated 
individuals to purchase an insurance policy from third parties at inflated prices 
based on claims of power under article I, section 8 power to regulate interstate 
commerce and, some argue, its authority to levy certain taxes—Heritage legal 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Todd Gaziano and Elizabeth Garvey, The Expansion of National 
Power at the Expense of Individual Liberty, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, ABC-CLIO 
(2011); Brian Walsh and Benjamin Keane, Overcriminalization and the 
Constitution, HERITAGE FOUNDATION LEGAL MEMORANDUM NO. 64 (April 13, 
2011) (raising constitutional concerns about various federal crime proposals); Hans 
A. von Spakovsky, Congress Must Now Address Civil Justice Reform to Impact 
Health Care, HEALTH REFORM REPORT (Jan. 20, 2011) (noting that Congress 
cannot establish medical malpractice caps directly even though that is a desirable 
state tort reform goal for providers in federal healthcare programs); Andrew 
Grossman, The Enumerated Powers Act: A First Step Toward Constitutional 
Government, HERITAGE FOUNDATION LEGAL MEMORANDUM NO. 41 (June 23, 
2009); Brian Walsh and Andrew Grossman, Human Trafficking Reauthorization 
Would Undermine Existing Anti-Trafficking Efforts and Constitutional Federalism, 
HERITAGE FOUNDATION LEGAL MEMORANDUM NO. 21 (Feb. 14, 2008) (voicing 
constitutional doubt about federal anti-prostitution proposals); Erica Little and 
Brian Walsh, The Gang Abatement and Prevention Act: A Counterproductive and 
Unconstitutional Intrusion into State and Local Responsibilities, HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION WEBMEMO NO.1619 (Sept. 17, 2007) (raising constitutional doubt 
about certain federal proposals to target gang violence). 
11 The papers discussed in the preceding footnote with parenthetical notes are good 
examples. 
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scholars expressed the unequivocal position that Congress had no power to impose 
such a mandate. In short, Heritage scholars explained that the mandate would be 
unconstitutional. 
Heritage’s first formal legal analysis of the individual mandate in the 
PPACA was an 18-page Legal Memorandum published in December 2009, and its 
title expresses its simple conclusion. See Randy Barnett, Nathaniel Stewart, and 
Todd Gaziano, Why the Personal Mandate to Buy Health Insurance Is 
Unprecedented and Unconstitutional, HERITAGE FOUNDATION LEGAL 
MEMORANDUM NO. 49 (Dec. 9, 2009). The main purpose of this brief is not to re-
argue the merits of the issue before this Court—that job is being ably performed by 
the States and the NFIB—but to refute the notion that Heritage or other faithful 
constitutional scholars could defend an individual mandate like that in the PPACA.  
Unlike some in Congress who advocated passing the bill and then 
discovering what it contained, the authors of the Heritage Legal Memorandum 
carefully studied the bill’s provisions and relevant legal authorities. The Heritage 
Legal Memorandum conceded that certain health care proposals which are abysmal 
public policies and which would do tremendous damage to core societal interests—
most notably, a compulsory, single-payer system—may nonetheless pass 
constitutional muster in the courts. Id. at 12 (“[T]he courts may well allow 
Congress to use its taxing and spending powers to craft a general income tax 
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sufficient to pay for health care insurance for more Americans.”). Accordingly, 
how the federal government implemented an individual mandate was integral to the 
authors’ legal analysis.12 
The principle that “the means matter” not only respects the Constitution’s 
actual text (it is not merely a font of aspirations), but it is one endorsed time-and-
again by the Supreme Court:  Just because government may achieve a policy 
objective utilizing one means authorized by one enumerated power does not mean 
that it can accomplish the same object using any means. See Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (acknowledging the potential authority to condition 
funds on state and local officials performing specified functions, but rejecting 
congressional attempts to commandeer or mandate the same compliance).  
Co-authored by prominent outside legal scholars and the Director of 
Heritage’s Legal Center, the Legal Memorandum briefly noted the bad policy 
implications of the individual mandate.  Its authors then concluded after carefully 
reviewing the constitutional text and court precedents that this unprecedented 
mandate on citizens (who wish to do nothing) to engage in a particular commercial 
transaction would bend the Commerce Clause to the point of breaking: 
                                                 
12 The Legal Memorandum correctly noted that “[s]hould it adopt any of these 
constitutional taxing and spending measures, Congress would have to incur the 
political costs arising from increasing the income tax.…” Id. at 12. 
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To uphold the insurance purchase mandate, the Supreme Court would 
have to concede that the Commerce Clause has no limits, a 
proposition that it has never affirmed, that it rejected in Lopez and 
Morrison, and from which it did not retreat in Raich. Although 
Congress may possibly regulate the operations of health care or health 
insurance companies directly, given that they are economic activities 
with a substantial effect on interstate commerce, it may not regulate 
the individual’s decision not to purchase a service or enter into a 
contract.  If Congress can mandate this, then it can mandate anything. 
 
Id. at Executive Summary 2. 
During the debate over the PPACA, Heritage’s Legal Memorandum was 
entered into the Congressional Record twice in support of constitutional points of 
order raised by Senators Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and John Ensign (R-NV), 111 CONG. 
REC. S13015 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2009) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch); 111 CONG. 
REC. S13723 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. John Ensign), and was 
prominently discussed in support of Rep. Steve Scalise’s amendment to repeal the 
individual mandate, 111 CONG. REC. D311 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2010). Heritage’s 
legal analysis was also reprinted or cited in leading national newspapers and in 
numerous other prominent, national publications.13 
                                                 
13 The Wall Street Journal republished the entire Legal Memorandum on Dec. 23, 
2009. See also Ben Pershing, Some foes of health-care bill hope courts will stop 
legislation, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2010; Randy Barnett, Outlook: Is health-care 
reform unconstitutional? WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2010 (quoting portions of the 
Legal Memorandum); No mandate for government health care, WASH. TIMES, 
Dec.18, 2009. 
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Given the entry of its Legal Memorandum into the Congressional Record 
during the debates over the bill, and prominent citations in the popular press, it is 
reasonable to infer that the United States and others should be well aware of 
Heritage’s position objecting to the specific insurance mandate in the PPACA—as 
both bad policy and as an unconstitutional exercise of government power. Yet the 
government’s selective quote from a 21-year-old lecture may nevertheless lead to 
the incorrect inference regarding Heritage’s current position and the state of policy 
research generally. Whatever else, it seems like a sign of desperation from a 
government with little policy or legal cover. 
CONCLUSION 
 Heritage’s empirical and other health policy research and its uniform 
constitutional analysis are mutually reinforcing and point in the same direction.  
The policy literature is clear: individual mandates are not necessary to provide 
broad-based coverage, and the individual mandate in the PPACA is unsound 
policy.  It also violates the U.S. Constitution. For the reasons set forth above, 
Heritage respectfully requests this Court to take notice of its actual position 
opposing individual mandates—a position quite different from the one Appellants 
quote in their opening brief. Consistent with Heritage’s actual views, the court 
should affirm the judgment of the district court in appeal No. 11-11021. 
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